When tort and insurance (both private and social) co-exist, coordination mechanisms are very relevant. Imperfect liability rules provide the setting to properly analyze the incentives that the coordination mechanisms induce for risk coverage and for precaution...

We analyze what can be inferred about a game's information structure solely from the probability distributions on action profiles generated during play; i.e., without reference to special behavioral assumptions or equilibrium concepts. Our analysis focuses on deriving payoff-independent...

In this paper we investigate the risk sharing potential of financial intermediaries in an overlapping generations economy. We find that the intermediaries allocations are constrained by the temptation of the living to liquidate their intermediary s assets and share the proceeds amongst...

A large theoretical literature on value capture following Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) uses cooperative games under complete information to study how and why firms earn supernormal profits. However, firms often have different information, beliefs, or creative foresight. We extend value...

How does competition among economic actors determine the value that each is able to appropriate? We provide a formal, general framework within which this question can be posed and answered, and then provide several results. Chief among them is a condition that is both required for, and...

The broker profits by intermediating between two (or more) parties. Using a biform game, we examine whether such a position can confer a competitive advantage, as well as whether any such advantage could persist if actors formed relations strategically. Our analysis reveals that, if one...