Barberis and Shleifer (2003) argue that style investing generates momentum and reversals in style and individual asset returns, as well as comovement between individual assets and their styles. Consistent with these predictions, in some specifications, past style returns help explain future...

We study how plan sponsors choose investment management firms from their opportunity set when delegating $1.6 trillion in assets between 2002 and 2017. Two factors play an influential role in choice: pre-hiring returns, and pre-existing personal connections between personnel at the plan (or...

We study the selection of private equity managers (GPs) for over 100,000 capital commitments between 1990 and 2019 by global institutional investors (LPs) choosing from a plausible contemporaneous opportunity set. In addition to chasing GPs with high prior performance, LPs have large...

Barberis and Shleifer (2003) argue that style investing generates (a) comovement between individual assets and their styles, and (b) momentum and reversals in both style and asset returns. These predictions imply that one can use comovement to assess the impact of style investing on asset-level...

We observe less efficient capital allocation in countries whose banking systems are more thoroughly controlled by tycoons or families. The magnitude of this effect is similar to that of state control over banking. Unlike state control, tycoon or family control also correlates with slower...