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Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership
Le Breton, Michel; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Savvateev, … - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 42 (2013) 3, pp. 673-694
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785624
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Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership
Le Breton, Michel; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Savvateev, … - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009726084
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Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership
Le Breton, Michel; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Savvateev, … - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008907391
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Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership
Le Breton, Michel; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Savvateev, … - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009579377
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Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership
Le Breton, Michel; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Savvateev, … - Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse … - 2012
This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268426
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Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership
Le Breton, Michel; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Savvateev, … - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2012
This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004727
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Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership
LE BRETON, Michel; MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D.; SAVVATEEV, … - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2010
This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836134
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Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership
Breton, Michel Le; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Savvateev, … - Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad … - 2010
This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008752111
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Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership
Breton, Michel Le; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Savvateev, … - Departamento de Economía, Universidad Pablo de Olavide - 2010
This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008764895
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"Almost" subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting
Drèze, Jacques H.; Le Breton, Michel; Savvateev, Aleksej V. - In: Journal of economic theory 143 (2008) 1, pp. 275-291
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003812164