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Bonus pools and the informativeness principle

Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - In: European economic review : EER 66 (2014), pp. 180-191

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010423081

Overwhelmed by routine tasks : a multi-tasking principal agent perspective

Demougin, Dominique; Helm, Carsten - 2022

We analyze a multitasking model with a verifiable routine task and a skill-dependent activity characterized by moral hazard. Contracts negotiated by firm/employee pairs follow from Nash bargaining. High- and low-skilled employees specialize, intermediate productivity employees perform both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013201713

Tournaments with gaps

Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - 2013

A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents' performance is measured on a cardinal scale …, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198511

Standards and incentives under moral hazard with limited liability

Reinshagen, Felix - 2012

dimension of the agent's effort is observable and the other is not. The principal can thusmake the contract conditional not only … on outcome but also on observable effort. The principal's optimal contract gives the agent no rent and - in contrast to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490184

Only time will tell : a theory of deferred compensation

Hoffmann, Florian; Inderst, Roman; Opp, Marcus M. - 2018

This paper provides a complete characterization of optimal contracts in principal-agent settings where the agent's action has persistent effects. We model general information environments via the stochastic process of the likelihood-ratio. The martingale property of this performance metric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891844

Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave

Englmaier, Florian - 2010

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141421

Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship

Budde, Jörg (contributor); Kräkel, Matthias (contributor) - 2008

Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle ont hepositive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782288

Empowerment and the dark side of delegation

Kräkel, Matthias - 2018

The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the preferences of principal and agent are exogenously...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795221

Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave

Englmaier, Florian; Mühlheußer, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822065

Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship

Budde, Jörg; Kräkel, Matthias - 2008

Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383018