We study a new monotonicity problem in combinatorial auctions called goods revenue　monotonicity, which requires that the auctioneer earn no more revenue by dropping goods from the endowments. Although no mechanism satisfies goods revenue monotonicity together with strategy-proofness,...

This paper studies a machine (finite automaton) playing a two-player repeated game of a simple extensive-form game with perfect information. We introduce a new complexity measure called multiple complexity which incorporates a strategyʼs responsiveness to information in the stage game as well...

When encountering a set of alternatives displayed in the form of a list, the decision maker usually determines a particular alternative, after which she stops checking the remaining ones, and chooses an alternative from those observed so far. We present a framework in which both decision...

This paper studies a two-player machine (finite automaton) game in which an extensive game with perfect information is infinitely repeated. We introduce a new measure of strategic complexity named "multiple complexity", which considers the responsiveness of a strategy to information as well as...

When encountering a set of alternatives displayed in the form of a list, the decision maker usually determines a particular alternative, after which she stops checking the remaining ones, and chooses an alternative from those observed so far. We present a framework in which both decision...

We study manipulation via endowments in a market in an auction setting with multiple goods. In the market, there are buyers whose valuations are their private information, and a seller whose set of endowments is her private information. A social planner, who wants to implement a socially...