Key aspects in economic integrated areas like the EU are both the internationalization of productive activities, which usually occurs in unionized countries, and the ongoing process of labor market integration. In a symmetric two-country duopoly model with integrated product markets, this paper...

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical microeconomic literature on the effects of product market integration and internationalization of firms activities upon labor unions. It relates these issues to the European experience, indicating future lines of research in this field.

Assuming Cournot competition, Bughin (1999, 'The strategic choice of union-oligopoly bargaining agenda', International Journal of Industrial Organization) states that in a unionized oligopoly with firm specific negotiations, Efficient Bargaining (EB) is always the industry equilibrium both under...

This work represents an extension of the model presented by Olivier Blanchard in occasion of the Lionel Robbins' Letures (2000) given M.I.T. It analyzes the transnational cooperative behavior of trade unions in a two symmetric country-model with monopolistic competition firms present in the two...

This paper investigates the coordination of bargaining activities among labor unions in a Multinational Enterprise (MNE) with plants in different countries. Making use of a threestage game where the parties sequentially decide whether o coordinate negotiations, it derives the bargaining regimes...

In a two-country duopoly model with integrated product markets, this paper investigates the incentives for unions to coordinate wage demands in the presence of transaction costs, and the sustainability of unions' wage collusion. Contrary to conventional wisdom that wage collusion is always...

This paper investigates the bargaining agenda selection in a unionised monopoly with network effects. In contrast with the established result that monopolist always prefers Right-To-Manage (RTM), it is shown that monopolist prefers Sequential Efficient Bargaining (SEB), provided that the network...

In a unionised Cournot duopoly, the present paper extensively re-examines the subject of the bargaining scope between firms and unions. It investigates the endogenous equilibrium agenda (Right-to-Manage vs Efficient Bargaining) that can arise under three timing specification of the bargaining...

The present paper investigates the determination of the bargaining agenda in a unionised monopoly with managerial delegation, without and with network effects in consumption. First, we show that, in contrast with the received literature, monopolist hires a manager even in the absence of...