Does gender play a role in the context of team work? Our results based on a real-effort experiment suggest that performance depends on the composition of the team. We find that female and male performance differ most in mixed teams with revenue sharing between the team members, as men put in...

We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the effect of increasing the number of competing employers from two to three. In all treatments, efficient workers invest more often in education and employers pay higher...

We study the voluntary revelation of private information in a labor-market experiment where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payoff, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further revelation. Such unraveling can...

Bei der Reform des weiterführenden Schulzugangs sollte Berlin internationale Erfahrungen nutzen. Es kommt beim Auswahlverfahren auf die Details an. Ein zentrales Verfahren und eine größere Zahl möglicher Schülerwünsche sind entscheidend. Losverfahren sind nicht per se ungerecht. Sie...

Die Reform der Studienplatzvergabe ist verschoben - trotz offensichtlicher Vorteile des neuen Verfahrens. Hochschulen können ihre Studienplätze früher, effizienter und nach eigenen Wünschen vergeben. Strategisches Bewerber-Verhalten zahlt sich nicht mehr aus. Das schafft Chancengleichheit....

We study the voluntary revelation of private information in a labor-market experiment where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker׳s payoff, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further revelation. Such unraveling can...

Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the mechanism currently employed by the German central...

Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The fi rst mechanism is a simplifi ed version of the mechanism currently employed by the German...

We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of their efforts. We assume that student preferences are...