The paper presents a theoretical model with bureaucratic corruption where bribe income can leak out of an economy. In such an economy given its perception about the extent of leakage the government sets the price of public services required for entrepreneurship by maximizing the welfare of the...

The present paper examines how an innovating firm decides between two forms of voluntary agreements (VA) in a context, where a non-governmental organization (NGO) rather than a regulator watches over citizens' interests. The innovation generates profit and consumer surplus as well as...

The paper uses a Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson type general equilibrium framework to consider the incidence of an outsourcing tax on an economy in which the production of a specific intermediate input has been fragmented and outsourced. If the outsourced sector provides a non-traded input, the...

The paper considers a situation where two countries - the North and the South - use a non-traded polluting input to produce the goods for final consumption. The North is more efficient in both, production and abatement processes. The study compares the effects of the transfer of abatement...

The paper questions the wisdom that speed-money paid to accelerate delivery of a good provided by a government necessarily increases welfare. In presence of a time-consuming screening process, it exploits the trade-off between the reduced delivery-time and increased misallocation, to identify...

We study the economic relationship between globalization and inequality within a country. In a partial equilibrium it is shown even when the local government exclusively maximizes the welfare of the marginalized (unemployed) people, relative consumption inequality between employed and the...

Rent seeking within the vast informal segment of the developing world is a relatively underdexplored topic in the interface of labor market policies and public economics. Moreover, how rent seeking and corruption within the informal segment is affected by economic reforms targeted for the formal...