We study a cooperative problem where agents contribute a certain amount of input in order to obtain a surplus. We assume that the average surplus with respect to the amount contributed is increasing. Within this basic model, a cooperative game is associated and the proportional distribution...

An assignment game is defined by a matrix A, where each row represents a buyer and each column a seller. If buyer i is matched with seller j, the market produces aij units of utility. We study Monge assignment games, that is bilateral cooperative assignment games where the assignment matrix...

For each assignment market, an associated bargaining problem is defined and some bargaining solutions to this problem are analyzed. For a particular choice of the disagreement point, the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution coincide and give the midpoint between the buyers-optimal...

This article considers single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games that satisfy core selection and aggregate monotonicity, defined either on the set of all games, G <Superscript> N </Superscript>, or on the set of essential games, E <Superscript> N </Superscript> (those with a non-empty imputation set). The main result is that...</superscript></superscript>

The existence of von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions (stable sets) for assignment games has been an unsolved question since Shapley and Shubik (1972) [11]. For each optimal matching between buyers and sellers, Shubik (1984) [12] proposed considering the union of the core of the game and the core...

Convex cooperative games were first introduced by Shapley (Int J Game Theory 1:11–26, <CitationRef CitationID="CR11">1971</CitationRef>) while population monotonic allocation schemes (PMAS) were subsequently proposed by Sprumont (Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, <CitationRef CitationID="CR13">1990</CitationRef>). In this paper we provide several characterizations of convex games and...</citationref></citationref>

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a max-convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas’ five player game with a unique stable set different from the...