We formulate a general theory of preferences over outcome-time-probability triplets and decompose uncertainty into risk and hazard. We define the delay, defer, shift and certainty functions that can be uniquely elicited from behaviour. These individually determine stationarity, the common...

We derive, compare, and test the predictions of three models of gift exchange: Classical (CGE); Augmented (AGE) based on unexpected wage surprises and first order beliefs; and Belief-based (BGE) that uses second order beliefs to formally model guilt-aversion. Motivated by Akerlof (1982), we also...

We consider a public goods game which incorporates guilt-aversion/surprise-seeking and the attribution of intentions behind these emotions (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Khalmetski et al., 2015). We implement the induced beliefs method (Ellingsen et al., 2010) and a within-subjects design using...

We consider a theoretical model of a public goods game that incorporates reciprocity, guilt-aversion/surprise-seeking, and the attribution of intentions behind these emotions. In order to test our predictions, we implement the ‘induced beliefs method' and a within-subjects design, using the...

We show that preference-homogeneity and loss-aversion are necessary and sufficient for the value function to have the power form with identical powers for gains and losses and for the probability weighting functions for gains and losses to be identical

We consider a theoretical model of a public goods game that incorporates reciprocity, guilt-aversion/surprise-seeking, and the attribution of intentions behind these emotions. In order to test our predictions, we implement the "induced beliefs method" and a within-subjects design, using the...