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Splitting Leagues
Kräkel, Matthias - University of Bonn, Germany - 2003
Splitting leagues or tournaments seems to be puzzling when agents are homogeneous and splitting leads to a negative … used as a divide-and-rule strategy by the principal to create additional incentives when collusion among the agents is … tournaments (i.e., tournaments that are intertemporally linked), which also enhances incentives. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968376
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Incentives and the sorting of altruistic agents into street-level bureaucracies
Buurman, Margaretha; Dur, Robert A. J. - 2010
Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377373
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Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street-Level Bureaucracies
Buurman, Margaretha - 2008
Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012722555
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Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street-Level Bureaucracies
Buurman, Margaretha; Dur, Robert - 2021
Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324768
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Incentives and workers' motivation in the public sector
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert - 2004
Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261219
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Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert - 2004
Civil servants have a reputation for being lazy. However, people's personal experiences with civil servants frequently run counter to this stereotype. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325258
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Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street-Level Bureaucracies
Buurman, Margaretha; Dur, Robert - 2008
Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325683
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Incentives and workers' motivation in the public sector : presented at CESifo Area Conference on Public Sector Economics, May 2004
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A. J. - 2004
Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449658
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Incentives and workers' motivation in the public sector
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A. J. - 2006
Civil servants have a reputation for being lazy. However, people's personal experiences with civil servants frequently run counter to this stereotype. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335183
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The desire for impact
Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2006
This paper explores the meaning and implications of the desire by workers for impact. We find that this impact motive can make a firm in a competitive labor market face an upward-sloping supply curve of labor, lead workers with the same characteristics but at different firms to earn different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337969