In a game with rational expectations individuals refine their information with the information revealed by the elementary acts of other individuals at each state of the world. At a Nash equilibrium profile of strategies information is essentially symemetric when the same profile is also an...

We study Myerson's incomplete information bargaining solution under the assumption of verifiable types. For the case of an informed principal, in which one individual has all the bargaining power, we provide exact characterizations both from the non cooperative and from the cooperative...

Asymmetric information concerns either commodities or mutually exclusive states of the world. The notion of competitive equilibrium differs between the two cases. In particular, incentive compatibility constraints are only relevant in the case of asymmetric information concerning mutually...

Domestic transfers such that all individuals gain in utility with international trade, compared to domestic autarky, need not exist.

We propose an extension of the standard general equilibrium model with production and incomplete markets to situations in which (i) private investors have limited information on the returns of specific assets, (ii) managers of firms have limited information on the preferences of individual...