We estimate the responses of gross labor income with respect to marginal and average net-oftax rates in France over the period 2003-2006. We exploit a series of reforms to the income-tax and payroll-tax schedules affecting individuals who earn less than twice the minimum wage. Our estimate for...

We investigate how potential tax-driven migrations modify the Mirrlees income tax schedule when two countries play Nash. The social objective is the maximin and preferences are quasilinear in income. Individuals differ both in skills and migration costs, which are continuously distributed. We...

We investigate how the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule is modified when taxpayers can evade taxation by emigrating. We consider two symmetric countries with Maximin governments. Workers choose their labor supply along the intensive margin. The skill distribution is continuous, and, for...

[fre] Cet article étudie si la mise en place d’une allocation universelle pourrait réduire à la fois le chômage et les inégalités. La présence d’allocation universelle se traduit par davantage de progressivité dans le système fiscal, ce qui réduit la pression salariale exprimée...

We estimate the responses of gross labor income with respect to marginal and average net-of-tax rates in France over the period 2003–2006. We exploit a series of reforms to the income-tax and payroll-tax schedules affecting individuals who earn less than twice the minimum wage. Our estimate...

We estimate the responses of gross labor earnings with respect to marginal and average net-of-tax rates in France over the period 2003-2006. We exploit a series of reforms to the income-tax and the payroll-tax schedules that affect individuals who earn less than twice the minimum wage. Our...

This paper characterizes the optimal redistributive tax schedule in a search–matching framework where (voluntary) nonparticipation and (involuntary) unemployment are endogenous and wages are determined by proportional bargaining à la Kalai. The optimal employment tax rate is given by an...