. -- Communal responsibility ; anonymous matching ; money demand ; credit ; bills of exchange …Communal responsibility, a medieval institution studied by Greif (2006), supported the use of credit among European …. Enforceability within each village's centralized afternoon market ensures collateralization of credit in decentralized markets. In …

Communal responsibility, a medieval institution studied by Greif (2006), supported the use of credit among European …. Enforceability within each village's centralized afternoon market ensures collateralization of credit in decentralized markets. In … the resulting equilibrium, money and credit coexist in decentralized markets if the use of credit is costly. Our analysis …

Communal responsibility, a medieval institution studied by Greif (2006), supported the use of credit among European …. Enforceability within each village's centralized afternoon market ensures collateralization of credit in decentralized markets. In … the resulting equilibrium, money and credit coexist in decentralized markets if the use of credit is costly. Our analysis …

Communal responsibility, a medieval institution studied by Greif (2006), supported the use of credit among European …. Enforceability within each village's centralized afternoon market ensures collateralization of credit in decentralized markets. In … the resulting equilibrium, money and credit coexist in decentralized markets if the use of credit is costly. Our analysis …

Communal responsibility, a medieval institution studied by Greif (2006), supported the use of credit among European …. Enforceability within each village's centralized afternoon market ensures collateralization of credit in decentralized markets. In … the resulting equilibrium, money and credit coexist in decentralized markets if the use of credit is costly. Our analysis …

Communal responsibility, a medieval institution studied by Greif (2006), supported the use of credit among European …. Enforceability within each village's centralized afternoon market ensures collateralization of credit in decentralized markets. In … the resulting equilibrium, money and credit coexist in decentralized markets if the use of credit is costly. Our analysis …

-state Markov chain. We derive conditions under which cash and credit in the anonymous matching market coexist. For fixed but suffi … use of credit reduces the money holdup in the matching market and thus leads to Pareto improvements … debts in-curred by any merchant from their hometown. We argue that communal responsibility was effective in enforcing credit …

Communal responsibility, a medieval institution studied by Greif (2006), supported the use of credit among European …. Enforceability within each village's centralized afternoon market ensures collateralization of credit in decentralized markets. In … the resulting equilibrium, money and credit coexist in decentralized markets if the use of credit is costly. Our analysis …