Transparency in teams can facilitate cooperation. We study contribution decisions by agents when previous decisions can be observed. We find that an information chain, in which each agent directly observes only the decision of her immediate predecessor, is at least as effective as a...

Transparency in teams can induce cooperation. We study contribution decisions by agents when previous decisions can be observed. We find that an information chain, in which each agent directly observes only the decision of her immediate predecessor, is at least as effective as a...

Amidst a sharp increase in household debt levels, many countries have substantially reformedtheir consumer bankruptcy regulations. I first classify the mechanisms triggered by current U.S.and European bankruptcy regulations and then evaluate these mechanisms within a hidden actionmodel. I...

A popular view of limited liability in financial contracting is that it is the result of societal preferences against escessive penalties. The view of most financial economists is instead that limited liability emerged as an optimal institution when, in the absence of a clear limit on economic...

In the light of increasing household debt, several countries are substantiallyreforming their consumer bankruptcy regulations. This paperfirst classifies the mechanisms triggered by both U.S. and European bankruptcyregulations. Then, I test these mechanisms within a hidden actionmodel. Here, I...

Consumer bankruptcy regulation in the United States as well as in many other countries allow consumers to petition for a partial debt discharge. Usually, a debt release is possiblewhen the debtor behaves in the creditors best interest and after filing for bankruptcy signs over her entire...

We experimentally test whether intentional and observable discriminatorypay of symmetric agents in the Winter (2004) game causes lowpaid agents to reduce effort. We control for intentionality of wages byeither allowing a principal to determine wages or by implementing arandom process. Our main...