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Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach
Garrett, Daniel; Pavan, Alessandro - Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino - 2009
less high-powered incentives than younger ones then depends on the interaction between the degree of risk aversion and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008518904
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Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach
Garrett, Daniel; Pavan, Alessandro - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2009
less high-powered incentives than younger ones then depends on the interaction between the degree of risk aversion and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008597112
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Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services
Levaggi, Rosella; Moretto, Michele; Pertile, Paolo - 2023
This paper aims to characterise a dynamic, incentive-compatible contract for the provision of health services, allowing for both moral hazard and adverse selection. Patients' severity changes over time following a stochastic process and is private information of the provider. We characterise the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014342117
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Dynamic managerial compensation : on the optimality of seniority-based schemes
Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - 2014
We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically … with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may … power of incentives later in the relationship. Our results follow from a new variational approach that permits us to tackle …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476876
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Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality based approach
Arie, Guy - 2011
thus far puzzling use of non-linear incentives, for example in sales-force compensation. The result is obtained by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009699416
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Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services
Levaggi, Rosella; Moretto, Michele; Pertile, Paolo - 2023
This paper aims to characterise a dynamic, incentive-compatible contract for the provision of health services, allowing for both moral hazard and adverse selection. Patients' severity changes over time following a stochastic process and is private information of the provider. We characterise the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014451718
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Managerial turnover in a changing world
Pavan, Alessandro; Garrett, Daniel - 2010
We characterize a firm's profit-maximizing turnover policy in an environment where managerial productivity changes stochastically over time and is the managers' private information. Our key positive result shows that the productivity level that the firm requires for retention declines with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332108
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Dynamic managerial compensation: On the optimality of seniority-based schemes
Garrett, Daniel; Pavan, Alessandro - 2014
We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically … with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may … power of incentives later in the relationship. Our results follow from a new variational approach that permits us to tackle …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335456
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Managerial turnover in a changing world
Garrett, Daniel; Pavan, Alessandro - 2010
We characterize a firm's profit-maximizing turnover policy in an environment where managerial productivity changes stochastically over time and is the managers' private information. Our key positive result shows that the productivity level that the firm requires for retention declines with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282881
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Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes
Garrett, Daniel; Pavan, Alessandro - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2014
We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash ows changes stochastically … with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may … power of incentives later in the relationship. Our results follow from a new variational approach that permits us to tackle …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165973