We propose a model of delegated asset management in which individual investors are more informed about the domestic market than the foreign market and face uncertainty about quality of portfolio managers. The model shows that asymmetric information of individual investors results in home bias...

We compare centralized and decentralized policy making in a federation in which policy heterogeneity is inherently costly and preferences vary across jurisdictions: all jurisdictions agree that some harmonization is desirable but no one agrees on the direction of harmonization. This type of...

Two players choose whether to cooperate on a project. Each of them is endowed with some evidence, and if both possess a sufficient amount then cooperation is profitable. In order to facilitate cooperation the players reveal evidence to one another. However, some players are concerned about...

We propose a model of delegated asset management that can explain the following empirical regularities in international markets: the presence of home bias, the lower proportion of mutual funds investing domestically, and the higher market value of mutual funds investing domestically. In the...

We study a model that characterizes the conditions under which past misbehavior becomes the subject of present scandal, with consequences for both the implicated politician and the parties that work with him. In the model, both authentic and fake scandals arise endogenously within a political...

Cheap-talk lies are at risk of being detected. We investigate the implications of this fact in a communication game in which players have no common interests and messages are cheap, but deceit is detectable with positive probability. In particular, when the sender makes a claim that is not true,...