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We study an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous-move stage game. Player one monitors the stagegame actions of player two imperfectly, while player two monitors the pure stagegame actions of player one perfectly. Player one’s type is...
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We model a long-run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form game of perfect information. There is incomplete information about the type of player 1 while player 2’s type is commonly known. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804920
Cripps et al. (2005) conjectured that in an infinitely repeated game with two equally patient players, if there is positive probability that the players could be Stackelberg types, then equilibrium behavior would resemble a war of attrition, i.e., a two-sided reputation result would hold. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804921
We consider the problem of selling a firm to a single buyer. The magnitude of the post-sale cash flow rights (v) as well as the benefits of control (b) are the buyer’s private information. In contrast to research that assumes the private information of the buyer is one-dimensional, the optimal...
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As school districts integrate charter schools for centralized admissions in Denver, New Orleans, Newark and Washington D.C., some charter schools have stayed out of the system. This is counterintuitive as centralized clearinghouses are deemed beneficial to schools as well as students. We provide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006116
The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, then elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any responsive and symmetric equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012896425
We study the impact of unobservable replacements on the sustainability of reputation effects in frequently repeated games played by a long run player facing a sequence of short run players. At the beginning of every period the long-run player is replaced with a new long run player with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665713