We empirically measure the effects of increasing competition on equilibrium bidding in procurement auctions In common-value auctions the winner's curse counsels more conservative bidding as the number of competitors increases First we estimate the structural parameters of an equilibrium bidding...

We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observations only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the "winner's curse" arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed...

We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the winner's curse' arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed...

We show how the equilibrium restrictions implied by standard search models can be used to estimate search-cost distributions using price data alone. We consider both sequential and nonsequential search strategies, and develop estimation methodologies that exploit equilibrium restrictions to...

We assess empirically the effects of the winner's curse which, in common-value auctions, counsels more conservative bidding as the number of competitors increases. First, we construct an econometric model of an auction in which bidders' preferences have both common- and private-value components,...

We develop a new estimation methodology for dynamic optimization models with unobserved shocks and deterministic accumulation of the observed state variables. Investment models are an important example of such models. Our pairwise-difference approach exploits two common features of these models:...