Aufgabe des vorliegenden Beitrages ist es, die wesentlichen Elemente und die Funktionsweise des strukturalistischen Ansatzes darzustellen und ihn auf seine Erklärungskraft bzgl. der empirisch festzustellenden andauernden Arbeitslosigkeit in den westlichen Industrieländern zu überprüfen. Eine...

This paper examines optimal two-period financial contracts between firms in a product market on the one side and banks as creditors on the other side. Similar to the Bolton-Scharfstein contracts, banks can mitigate the moral hazard problem of truthfully revealing the ex ante unknown profits of...

This paper presents a general-equilibrium model of Innovation, endogenous growth, and unemployment in a disaggregated economy. Unemployment is analyzed w ithin a dual labor market setting, where the labor market is consisting of a primary high-wage and a secondary low-wage sector. The...

This paper analyzes the influence of Information structure on the process of knowledge accumulation in a differential game of duopolistic R&D competition. By comparing open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria, representing imperfect and perfect information structures, we show that in the feedback...

Based on a stochastic dynamic model of a firm's optimal innovative behavior we derive a simultaneous equation system for product and process innovations with intertemporal spillover effects. We estimate various versions of the model with dichotomous Innovation data at the firm level by using a...

Based on the acquiring-a-company game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of...

We present a model of price leadership on homogeneous product markets where the price leader is selected endogenously. The price leader sets and guarantees a sales price to which followers adjust according to their individual supply functions. The price leader clears the market by serving the...

The paper presents a dynamic general-equilibrium model of education, quality and variety innovation, and scale-invariant growth. We consider endogenous human-capital accumulation in an educational sector and quality and variety innovation in two separate R&D sectors. In the balanced growth...

In three-person envy games, an allocator, a responder, and a dummy player interact. Since agreement payoffs of responder and dummy are exogenously given, there is no tradeoff between allocator payoff and the payoffs of responder and dummy. Rather, the allocator chooses the size of the pie and...