Based on the acquiring-a-company game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of...

In two-person generosity games, the proposer's agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously...

Based on the acquiring-a-company game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of...

This paper presents a general-equilibrium model of Innovation, endogenous growth, and unemployment in a disaggregated economy. Unemployment is analyzed w ithin a dual labor market setting, where the labor market is consisting of a primary high-wage and a secondary low-wage sector. The...

This paper examines optimal two-period financial contracts between firms in a product market on the one side and banks as creditors on the other side. Similar to the Bolton-Scharfstein contracts, banks can mitigate the moral hazard problem of truthfully revealing the ex ante unknown profits of...

Based on a stochastic dynamic model of a firm's optimal innovative behavior we derive a simultaneous equation system for product and process innovations with intertemporal spillover effects. We estimate various versions of the model with dichotomous Innovation data at the firm level by using a...

This paper analyzes the influence of Information structure on the process of knowledge accumulation in a differential game of duopolistic R&D competition. By comparing open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria, representing imperfect and perfect information structures, we show that in the feedback...

Aufgabe des vorliegenden Beitrages ist es, die wesentlichen Elemente und die Funktionsweise des strukturalistischen Ansatzes darzustellen und ihn auf seine Erklärungskraft bzgl. der empirisch festzustellenden andauernden Arbeitslosigkeit in den westlichen Industrieländern zu überprüfen. Eine...

In three-person envy games, an allocator, a responder, and a dummy player interact. Since agreement payoffs of responder and dummy are exogenously given, there is no tradeoff between allocator payoff and the payoffs of responder and dummy. Rather, the allocator chooses the size of the pie and...

We present a class of dynamic general-equilibrium models of education, innovation and technology transfer to explain the evolution of industries and aggregate growth in closed and open economies. Firms employ educated workers in order to develop higher-quality products. The realization of...