The Coleman Power of the Collectivity to Act (CPCA) is a popular statistic that reflects the ability of a committee to pass a proposal. Applying the Shapley value to this measure, we derive a new power index that indicates each voter's contribution to the CPCA. This index is characterized by...

This book introduces a new rationalistic approach towards the formalization of Schelling's concept of focal points within a general game-theoretic framework. The focus is on focal points as a symmetry-breaking device. Hence, focal points in coordination games can be explained while focal points...

We suggest new characterizations of the Banzhaf value without the symmetry axiom, which reveal that the characterizations by Lehrer (1988, International Journal of Game Theory 17, 89-99) and Nowak (1997, International Journal of Game Theory 26, 127-141) as well as most of the characterizations...

The principle of weak monotonicity for cooperative games states that if a game changes so that the worth of the grand coalition and some player's marginal contribution to all coalitions increase or stay the same, then this player's payoff should not decrease. We investigate the class of values...

Within a simple setup, we show that fair redistribution of performance-based allocations implies proportional taxation. Fair redistribution is characterized by three properties: efficiency, i.e., redistribution has no cost. Anonymity, i.e., rewards after redistribution do not depend on the...

We suggest a full consolidation approach that takes into account the property rights structure within the subsidiaries, in particular, the majority requirements on restructurings. Our approach employs a property rights index based on cooperative game theory

First, we suggest and discuss second-order versions of solutions for TU games used to characterize the Banzhaf value, in particular, of standardness for two-player games, of the dummy player property, and of 2-efficiency. Then, we provide a number of characterizations of the Banzhaf value...