We study the choice of the regulatory structure when a regulated firm engages in different activities for different countries. Under decentralization each activity is regulated independently and the contracts offered to the firm suffer from two opposite distortions with respect to...

When firms undertake activities which are environmentally risky, the divergence between social and private incentives to exert safety care requires public intervention. This control occurs both through ex ante regulation and ex post legal investigation. We delineate the respective scopes of...

Producers of software viewers commonly offer basic versions of their products for free while more sophisticated versions are highly priced, thereby, providing less attractive or lower valuations consumers with larger utility levels. We give some foundations to this outcome called versioning. We...

We consider a tax competition game between asymmetrically un-informed governments. Two governments simultaneously propose tax arrangements to attract a multinational firm (MNF) which has an ex-ante preference to operate in both countries, and governments anticipate that once the MNF accepts...

Two producers offer differentiated goods to a representative consumer. The buyer has distinct marginal valuations for the quality of the products. Each producer perfectly knows the consumer's taste for its own product, but remains uninformed about its taste for the rival's product. When each...