In the trust game first player 1 decides between non-cooperation or trust in reciprocity and then, in the latter case, player 2 between exploiting player 1 or rewarding him. In our experiment, player 2 can be a notorically rewarding player (this type is implemented as a robot strategy) or a...

In the trust game first player 1 decides between non-cooperation or trust in reciprocity and then, in the latter case, player 2 between exploiting player 1 or rewarding him. In our experiment, player 2 can be a notorically rewarding player (this type is implemented as a robot strategy) or a...

In our tax evasion experiment each participant earns his income by solving intertemporal allocation tasks. The resulting income has to be declared in a tax return which is randomly verified. If tax evasion is detected, the subject is punished by a fixed penalty capturing the fact that (in...

Experimental studies of risk and time-preference typically focus on one of the two phenomena. The goal of this paper is to investigate the (possible) correlation between subjects' attitude to risk and their time-preference. For this sake we ask 61 subjects to price a simple lottery in 3...

The experimental situation presents a complex stochastic intertemporal allocation problem. First, two initial chance moves select one of three possible termination probabilities which then determines whether life lasts 3,4,5, or 6 periods. Compared to Anderhub et al. (1997) participants are...

The game theoretic prediction for alternating offer bargaining depends crucially on how 'the pie' changes over time, and whether the proposer in a given round has ultimatum power. We study experimentally eight such bargaining games. Each game is once repeated before moving on to the next one...