I revisit the question of which motive underlies insurance demand. I draw on the literature of state-dependent utility and on the literature of imperfectly divisible consumption to argue that the general purpose of insurance is not a risk transfer, but meeting a conditional need. In this way,...

Cost-sharing is regarded as an important tool to reduce moral hazard in health insurance. Contrary to standard prediction, however, such requirements are found to decrease utilization both of efficient and of inefficient care. I employ a simple model that incorporates two possible explanations -...

Some consumption opportunities, e.g. medical treatments, are both indivisible and only valuable in particular states of nature. The existence of such state-dependent indivisible consumption opportunities influences a person's risk attitudes. In general, people are not risk averse anymore even if...

Some consumption opportunities are both indivisible and only valuable in particular tates of nature. The existence of such state-dependent indivisible consumption opportunities influences a person’s risk attitudes. In general, people are not risk averse anymore even if utility from divisible...

We analyze how customers with limited attention value and choose among health plans. We show how the model can accommodate three observations regarding plan choice. First, people tend to overweight the premium and thus underappreciate the value of health insurance. Second, insurance companies...

Consumers frequently overinsure modest risks. I argue that confining consumers' insurance motives to a single motive - risk aversion - is responsible for the difficulty to rationalize this behavior. People who perform mental accounting have an additional motive for buying insurance. They...