Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Games and Economic Behavior, 1997) have provided useful conditions for the existence of a unique purestrategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games of complete information. In this paper, we generalize their results to contests with incomplete information. Two...

Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general conditions under which a given contest of...

Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Games and Economic Behavior, 1997) have provided useful conditions for the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games of complete information. In this paper, we generalize their results to contests with incomplete informa tion. Two...

We introduce the notion of an antichain-convex set to extend Debreu (1954)'s version of the second welfare theorem to economies where either the aggregate production set or preference relations are not convex. We show that (possibly after some redistribution of individuals' wealth) the Pareto...

This paper examines the conditions for the existence of a maximal element of a relation on every nonempty compact subset of its ground set. A preliminary analysis establishes some connections between the maximals of a relation and those of its right trace. Via this analysis, various results of...

We prove the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in nice games with isotone chain-concave best replies and compact strategy sets. We establish a preliminary fixpoint uniqueness argument showing sufficient assumptions on the best replies of a nice game that guarantee the...