Consider two parties who can make non-contractible investments in the provision of a public good. Who should own the physical assets needed to provide the public good? In the literature it has been argued that the party who values the public good most should be the owner, regardless of the...

The authors perform an original research on the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward the leveraged buyout transactions implementation during the private equity investment in the conditions of the resonant absorption of discrete information in the diffusion - type financial...

The authors perform an original research on the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward the leveraged buyout transactions implementation during the private equity investment in the conditions of the resonant absorption of discrete information in the diffusion - type financial...

The authors perform an original research on the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward the leveraged buyout transactions implementation during the private equity investment in the conditions of the resonant absorption of discrete information in the diffusion - type financial...

The authors perform an original research on the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward the leveraged buyout transactions implementation during the private equity investment in the conditions of the resonant absorption of discrete information in the diffusion - type financial...

Land, labor, indigenous knowledge and institutional resources of producers in the Central Highlands of Ethiopia are investigated. Frequency distribution and comparative statistical analysis of the two regions with respect to these and other parameters suggest that in a situation where all...

The paper discusses various definitions of transaction costs and, in a sense, represents a review of existing theories. This involves an attempt at defining transaction costs in relation to information costs, implicit and explicit costs, ex ante and ex post transaction costs. We offer a...

This paper offers a rationale for limiting the delegation of (real) authority, which neither relies on insurance arguments nor depends on ownership structure. We analyse a repeated hidden action model in which the actions of a risk neutral agent determine his future outside option. Consequently,...

In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in generating investment incentives. The model nests standard property-rights and hold-up models as special cases. I admit general message-dependent contracts, but provide conditions under which...

This paper addresses the question of delegation in a partial contracting set-up, where only the control over actions is contractible. We consider an organization that should take two decisions, affected by a common state of the world parameter only known by the agent. We show that, if the...