In this paper we propose an equilibrium model in order to analyze the impact of electricity market design on generation and transmission expansion in liberalized electricity markets. In a multi-level structure, our framework takes into account that generation investment and operation is decided...

We propose an equilibrium model for coupled markets of multiple energy sectors. The agents in our model are operators of sector-specific production and sector-coupling technologies, as well as price-sensitive consumers with varying demand. We analyze long-run investment in production capacity in...

This paper provides a first approach to assess gas market interaction on a network with nonconvex flow models. In the simplest possible setup that adequately reflects gas transport and market interaction, we elaborate on the relation of the solution of a simultaneous competitive gas market game,...

While single-level Nash equilibrium problems are quite well understood nowadays, less is known about multi-leader multi-follower games. However, these have important applications, e.g., in the analysis of electricity and gas markets, where often a limited number of firms interacts on various...

In entry-exit gas markets as they are currently implemented in Europe, network constraints do not affect market interaction beyond the technical capacities determined by the TSO that restrict the quantities individual firms can trade at the market. It is an up to now unanswered question to what...