It is shown that the two-player Tullock contest admits precisely one equilibrium in randomized strategies.

This paper considers rent-seeking games in which a small percentage change in a player's bid has a large percentage impact on her odds of winning, i.e., on the ratio of her respective probabilities of winning and losing. An example is the Tullock contest with a high R. The analysis provides a...

Some of the best-known results in mechanism design depend critically on Myerson’s (Math Oper Res 6:58–73, <CitationRef CitationID="CR22">1981</CitationRef>) regularity condition. For example, the second-price auction with reserve price is revenue maximizing only if the type distribution is regular. This paper offers two main findings....</citationref>

Some of the most beautiful results in mechanism design depend crucially on Myerson?s (1981) regularity condition. E.g., the second-price auction with reserve price is revenue maximizing only if the type distribution is regular. This paper offers two main results. First, an interpretation of...

I model a financial market that dries out in the wake of premature liquidations. Two main results are obtained. First, liquidity may vanish even if small, riskneutral buyers could easily compensate the ongoing selling. Thus, more markets are vulnerable to “runs” than suggested by previous...

In certain market environments, a large investor may benefit from building up a futures position first and trading subsequently in the spot market (Kumar and Seppi, 1992). The present paper identifies a variation of this type of manipulation that might occur in money markets with an interest...

We model the interbank market for overnight credit with heterogeneous banks and asymmetric information. An unsophisticated bank just trades to compensate its liquidity imbalance, while a sophisticated bank will exploit its private information about the liquidity situation in the market. It is...