In a pioneering approach towards the explanation of the phenomenon of 'yes man' behavior in organizations, Prendergast (1993) argued that incentive contracts in employment relationships generally make a worker distort his privately acquired information. This would imply that there is a trade-off...

In a pioneering approach towards the explanation of the phenomenon of "yes man" behavior in organizations, Prendergast [American Economic Review 83 (1993) 757-770] argued that incentive contracts in employment relationships generally make a worker distort his privately acquired information. This...

Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Games and Economic Behavior, 1997) have provided useful conditions for the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games of complete information. In this paper, we generalize their results to contests with incomplete informa tion. Two...

As pointed out by Sion and Wolfe (1957), a non-cooperative game on the unit square need not admit a Nash equilibrium, neither in pure nor in randomized strategies. In this paper, we consider finite approximations of the Sion-Wolfe game. For all parameter constellations relevant for the limit...

Sion and Wolfe (1957) presented a two-person zero-sum game on the unit square without a value. In the present paper, we analyze finite-grid approximations of the Sion-Wolfe game. We find that, as the number of grid points tends to infinity and the payoff function approaches that of the infinite...

Among the most puzzling observations for the euro money market are the bid shading in the weekly refinancing operations and the development of interest rate spreads. To explain these observations, we considera standard divisible-good auction à la Klemperer and Meyer (1989) with uniform or...