I introduce an undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibrium that is unique and is able to select undominated Nash equilibria in a quasi-supermodular game with a strict single-crossing property and monotonic externalities

We analyze the strategic allocation of resources across two contests as in the canonical Colonel Blotto game. In the games we study, two players simultaneously allocate their forces across two fields of battle. The larger force on each battlefield wins that battle, and the payoff to a player is...

This paper studies models where the optimal response functions under consideration are non-increasing in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include games with strategic substitutes, and include cases where additionally, some variables may be...

This paper is aimed at widening the scope of applications of majorized correspondences. A new class of majorized correspondences -- domain U-majorized correspondences -- is introduced. For them, a maximal element existence theorem is established. Then, sufficient conditions for the existence of...

This paper considers a class of two players games in the unit square for which a similar and high enough responsiveness of each player's strategy to the other player's strategy around a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies implies (i) the existence of at least two other Nash equilibria in pure...

Within the framework of a Diamond-Dybvig model, but with agents being able to choose autarky in the planning period, the optimal (run free) outcome is shown to be the unique pure strategy equilibrium consistent with a forward induction property. In a version of the model with multiple banks,...

Harsanyi and Selten (1988) have proposed a theory of equilibrium selection that selects a unique Nash equilibrium for any non-cooperative N-person game. The heart of their theory is given by the tracing procedure, a mathematical construction that adjusts arbitrary prior beliefs into equilibrium...

In this paper a procedure is described that computes for a given bimatrix game all stable sets in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Further the procedure is refined to find the strictly perfect equilibria (if any) of such a game. Keywords and Phrases: Bimatrix game, Computation, Stable...

The literature on the computation of Nash equilibria in n-person games is dominated by simplicial methods. This paper is the first to introduce a globally convergent algorithm that fully exploits the differentiability present in the problem. It presents an everywhere differentiable homotopy to...

Recently Yang and Qi (2013) stated an interesting theorem on existence of complete lattice of equilibria in a particular class of large nonatomic supermodular games for general action and players spaces. Unfortunately, their result is incorrect. In this note, we detail the nature of the problem...