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We present a general model of two players contest with two types of efforts. Contrary to the classical models of contest, where each player chooses a unique effort, and where the outcome depends on the efforts of all the players, contestants are allowed to reduce the effort of the opponent....
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This paper proposes the Stochastic-Share Contest, a novel contest format that combines the Winner-Take-All Contest and the Proportional-Prize Contest, with the former nesting the latter two as special cases. Motivated by the experimental contest literature, we include risk aversion and a "joy of...
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The robust finding of overbidding in experimental rent-seeking contests (Tullock 1980) fuels a vivid discussion on its causes (Sheremeta 2013). We contribute to this discussion by reporting a series of experiments on rent-seeking contests. We show that contestants hold myopic beliefs and match...
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We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one where no contestant would wish to change his choice...
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We investigate the incentive consequences of introducing the possibility of a draw into a lottery contest. Equilibrium total effort unambiguously decreases when draws are introduced, whereas the equilibrium expected winner's effort increases when the contestants' valuations of the prize become...
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We use a Tullock-type contest model to show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically and revenue equivalent to each other. We consider a two-player contest, where outcome-contingent payoffs are linear functions of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival....
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In this paper, we ask a fundamental design question in the theory of contests: Should contestants and reward money be pooled into a single grand contest, or should they be divided into parallel subcontests? We theoretically explore optimal divisioning using Tullock’s lottery contest framework...
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