We study behavior in experimental beauty contests with, first, boundary and interior equilibria, and, second, homogeneous and heterogenous types of players. We find quicker and better convergence to the game-theoretic equilibrium with interior equilibria and homogeneous players.

People have present-biased preferences: they choose more impatiently when choosing between an immediate reward and a delayed reward, than when choosing between a delayed reward and a more delayed reward. Following McClure et al. [McClure, S.M., Laibson, D.I., Loewenstein, G., Cohen, J.D. (2004)....

Tournament incentives prevail in labor markets, in particular with respect to promotions. Yet, it is often unclear to competitors how many winners there will be or how many applicants compete in the tournament. While it is hard to measure how this uncertainty affects work performance and...

Incentives are supposed to increase effort, yet individuals react differently to incentives. We examine this heterogeneity by investigating how personal characteristics, preferences, and socio-economic background relate to incentives and performance in a real effort task. We analyze the...