This paper examines the association between firms' debt financing structure and operating performance. The paper focuses on debt as the firms' loans from banks, which is the general trend of debt financing in Egypt. Firms' operating performance is measured by three operating measures. The...

The aim of the paper is to set the agency problem into a broad context of New Institutional Economics with an emphasis on historical connections. In the first section, I explain the historical evolution of basic theoretical concepts like the theory of firm, the theory of market process and the...

There are ongoing debates in the literature concerning the performance of family firms: some studies find superior performance among these companies, others find negative or neutral per-formance effects. In this research we employ agency theory to argue that the effects of family ownership vs....

We extend agency theory to propose that structural reform positively impacts firm profitability in developing countries because the improvements in external monitoring that accompany structural reform decrease the agency costs faced by firms. However, we also argue that not all firms benefit...

This paper examines a combined set of corporate governance features that influence disclosure quality in a context of ownership concentration. Agency theory presents a theoretical framework linking disclosure decision to corporate governance mechanisms. Using a Multiple Correspondence Analysis...

Cet article s’intéresse au rôle du contrôle exercé par le conseil d’administration dans la détermination de la rémunération des dirigeants français. L’ancrage théorique de cet article est celui de la théorie de l’agence, théorie dominante dans l’étude des déterminants de...

Consistent with predictions of agency theory, we find direct evidence that executive stock option grants have value implications for firm performance. This inference is drawn from evaluation of various motivations for the use of such grants in executive compensation: value enhancement, risk...