This paper shows that commodity trading advisors' (CTAs) investment performance may be partially explained by their incentive compensation contracts. Contracts include base, incentive and asset parameters. The relationships between contract parameters and performance are theoretically...

This paper evaluates the relative performances of several well--known and widely--used incentive mechanisms under controlled experimental conditions. The scenario utilized is a delegated investment setting where effort and risk aversions contribute to moral hazard among fund managers. Analytical...

A firm faces many problems that are inherently cross-functional. To solve them successfully requires the coordinated actions of many functional representatives acting in a decentralized setting. Functional managers, however, respond to their own individual incentives and may consequently fail to...

We compare quota-based salesforce compensation plans with the BLSS plan, i.e., the optimal curvilinear agency-theory-based compensation plans proposed in Basu, Lal, Srinivasan and Staelin (Basu, A. K., R. Lal, V. Srinivasan, R. Staelin. 1985. Salesforce compensation plans: An agency theoretic...

This paper examines inventory management from an incentive perspective. We show that when a manager has private information about future attainable revenues, the residual income performance measure based on historical cost can achieve optimal (second-best) incentives with regard to managerial...

This paper examines whether long-term managerial bonus schemes change the allocative behavior of subjects in a laboratory setting. Using four different compensation schemes, we show that a necessary condition for reconciling divergent time preferences between principals and agents is a...

Most large organizations allocate resources by means of fixed budgets: each subunit is normally entitled to spend a defined amount over a fixed period, usually one year. Fixed budgets create clear incentives for subunits to control costs. Yet such arrangements create major incentives for dynamic...

This paper reviews the significant progress in Üagency theoryÝ (i.e., the economic theory of incentives) during the 1990s, with an eye toward applications to supply transactions. I emphasize six recent models, in three pairs: (1) new foundations for the theory of incentive contracts, (2) new...

This paper studies sample design for process control in principal-agent settings where deterrence rather than ex post detection is the main issue. We show how the magnitude of gains from additional sampling can be calculated and traded off against sampling costs. It is shown that the optimal...

We study strategic interfirm competition allowing for internal conflicts in each seller firm. Intrafirm conflicts are captured by a multi-agent framework with principals implementing a revenue sharing scheme. For a given number of agents, interfirm competition leads to a higher revenue share for...