Prior academic research finds that formal controls can cause employees to engage in dysfunctional behaviors (e.g., decreased effort, fraud or theft). This study investigates one specific aspect of formal control that contributes to employees' negative reactions -- employees' beliefs about...

We analyze dictator allocation decisions in an experiment where the recipients have to earn the pot to be divided with a real-effort task. As the recipients move before the dictators, their effort decisions resemble the first move in a trust game. Depending on the recipients' performance, the...

Generalized reciprocity is a widely recognized but little studied component of social capital in organizations. We develop a causal model of the multiple mechanisms that sustain generalized reciprocity in an organization, drawing together disparate literatures in the social, organizational, and...

We propose that there are three determinants of sender behavior in trust games: Beliefs re-garding the amounts returned, risk aversion, and reciprocity. Particularly, we are interested in the role of reciprocity because the possibility of negative expected reciprocal utility may lead to...

This paper shows that reciprocity comes from the desire to cooperate in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game. Before playing the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game, players choose the reciprocity level and commit to it, and the reciprocity level is public information. There are T...

We explain contributions in public goods games with the help of the reciprocity model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) by applying some plausible modifications: Most importantly, we assume that subjects overestimate the kindness of their group members. In combination with the finding that...

We study procedures that embed clauses granting agents the right to oppose actions that are not in their interest, retract actions that face opposition, and punish harmful actions. Our analyses show that coalitional strategic behaviors under these procedures lead to reciprocal actions. We then...

Despite growing interest in leadership in the experimental literature, limited attention has been given to the theoretical analyses of leadership. This paper investigates the effectiveness of leading by example in public goods games among reciprocal agents. The ``leading-by-example'' (LBE) game...

We experimentally study how (un)selfish lies are reciprocated—or not—in subsequent economic interactions in a labor market. The experiment was conducted in two sequential stages, where the first stage was a deception game, and the second stage was a gift-exchange game. We find that while...