Herein we explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment via a truth-telling oath can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic sequential coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap-talk communication. Three...

Experiments based on the Beard and Beil (1994) two-player coordination game robustly show that coordination failures arise as a result of two puzzling behaviors: (i) subjects are not willing to rely on others' self-interested maximization, and (ii) self-interested maximization is not ubiquitous....

In experiments based on the Beard and Beil (1994) game, second movers very often fail to select the decision that maximizes both players payoff. This note reports on a new experimental treatment, in which we neutralize the potential effect of inequality aversion on the likelihood of this...

We experimentally study an asymmetric coordination game with two Nash equilibria: one is Pareto-efficient, the other is Pareto-inefficient and involves a weakly dominated strategy. We assess whether information about the interaction partner helps eliminate the imperfect equilibrium. Our...

Experiments based on the Beard and Beil (Manag Sci 40(2):252–262, <CitationRef CitationID="CR2">1994</CitationRef>) two-player coordination game robustly show that coordination failures arise as a result of two puzzling behaviors: (i) subjects are not willing to rely on others’ self-interested maximization, and (ii) self-interested...</citationref>

In experiments based on the Beard and Beil (1994) game, second movers very often fail to select the decision that maximizes both players payoff. This note reports on a new experimental treatment, in which we neutralize the potential effect of inequality aversion on the likelihood of this...

In experiments based on the Beard and Beil (1994) game, second movers very often fail to select the decision that maximizes both players payoff. This note reports on a new experimental treatment, in which we neutralize the potential effect of inequality aversion on the likelihood of this...

Several experimental studies show that ex post communication promotes generosity in situations where individual incentives contradict with common interest, like the provision of public goods. The root underlying the effect of this institution, especially in a repeated interaction, is nonetheless...

Herein we explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment via a truth-telling oath can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic sequential coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap-talk communication. Three...

This paper reports experimental results from a one-shot game with two Nash equilibria: the first one is efficient, the second one relies on weakly dominated strategies. The experimental treatments consider three information-enhancing mechanisms in the game: simple repetition, cheap-talk messages...