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Congestion, Equilibrium and Learning : The Minority Game

Kets, Willemien - 2007

The minority game is a simple congestion game in which the players? main goal is to choose among two options the one that is adopted by the smallest number of players. We characterize the set of Nash equilibria and the limiting behavior of several well-known learning processes in the minority...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012729173

Rationality, Strategic Uncertainty and Belief Diversity in Non-Cooperative Games

Zambrano, Eduardo - 2015

I investigate the existence of epistemic models for complete information games that satisfy the following properties: (R) players do not rule out their opponents use rational ex ante strategies for deriving their choices, (K) they do not rule out, ex ante, that they can come to know the action...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012707988

Strategies under strategic uncertainty

Mass, Helene - 2018

I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who faces uncertainty about the other players' strategies. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946016

The power of reasoning : experimental evidence

Dugar, Subhasish; Bhattacharya, Haimanti - 2008

This paper presents an experimental investigation of how a systematic variation in the cognitive demands on subjects affects the optimal play. The innovation of this paper is the choice of a game, which we call the Game of Position. This is a two-player zerosum game characterized by a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003844092

Countering the winner's curse : optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1399-1434

the allocation towards bidders with lower signals. This can be implemented via a modified Vickrey auction, where there is … a random reserve price for just the high bidder. The resulting allocation induces a â€œwinner's blessing,â€ whereby the … because of the winner's curse generated by the allocation rule. Our qualitative results extend to more general common value …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415457

Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism

Bergemann, Dirk - 2007

We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012776491

Hierarchical Cheap Talk

Ambrus, Attila - 2018

We investigate situations in which agents can communicate to each other only through a chain of intermediators, for example, because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication are strategic and might want to influence the action...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012929289

Malleable Lies : Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show

Turmunkh, Uyanga - 2020

We investigate the credibility of non-binding pre-play statements about cooperative behavior, using data from a high-stakes TV game show in which contestants play a variant on the classic Prisoner's Dilemma. We depart from the conventional binary approach of classifying statements as promises or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854643

Duffy, John - 2008

We report results from an experiment that explores the empirical validity of correlated equilibrium, an important generalization of the Nash equilibrium concept. Specifically, we seek to understand the conditions under which subjects playing the game of Chicken will condition their behavior on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723772

Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

A single unit of a good is to be sold by auction to one of two buyers. The good has either a high value or a low value, with known prior probabilities. The designer of the auction knows the prior over values but is uncertain about the correct model of the buyers' beliefs. The designer evaluates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012977350