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Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions

Bergemann, Dirk - 2014

We propose a sequential auction mechanism for a single object in which the seller jointly determines the allocation and … mechanism implements the allocation of the handicap auction of Esö and Szentes [10] but strengthens the participation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013045254

Information Sharing Decisions in All-Pay Auctions With Correlated Types

Lu, Jingfeng; Ma, Hongkun; Wang, Zhewei - 2022

In many real-life contests, contestants do not know their own type (e.g., value or ability) prior to a competition; and contestants’ types, which are observed privately once entering the contest, are often correlated with each other. We study a two-stage contest in which two players with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014243573

Information and Volatility

Bergemann, Dirk - 2014

In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the structure of private information influences aggregate volatility. The maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013045592

Noisy talk

Blume, Andreas; Board, Oliver J.; Kawamura, Kohei - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 4, pp. 395-440

We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences and a uniform type distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702289

Efficient Dynamic Auctions

Bergemann, Dirk; Välimäki, Juuso - 2006

We consider the truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in … dynamic allocation model is the sequential auction of a single good in which the current winner of the object receives … winner makes a positive payment leads to truthtelling. In general allocation problems, the marginal contribution mechanism …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014055354

Time-Consistent Policies

Karp, Larry S.; Lee, In-ho - 2001

In many cases the optimal open-loop policy to influence agents who solve dynamic problems is time-inconsistent. We show how to construct a time-consistent open-loop policy rule. We also consider an additional restriction under which the time-consistent open-loop policy is stationary. We use...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014136619

How Large Should the 'Bullet' Be? Dissecting the Role of Unilateral and Tie Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods

Liu, Jia - 2017

This paper evaluates the role of centralized punishment in boosting contribution to the provision of public goods. To avoid the race to the bottom in the provision of public goods, this centralized punishment mechanism relies on the use of the unilateral and tie punishment imposed on the lowest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951079

Robust Mechanisms for the Financing of Public Goods

Brooks, Benjamin; Du, Songzi - 2023

We propose a novel proportional cost-sharing mechanism for funding public goods with interdependent values: the agents simultaneously submit bids, which are non-negative numbers; the expenditure on the public good is an increasing and concave function of the sum of the bids; and each agent is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014347656

Procrastination and projects

Külpmann, Philipp - 2015

In this paper I analyze a dynamic moral hazard problem in teams with imperfect monitoring in continuous time. In the model, players are working together to achieve a breakthrough in a project while facing a deadline. The effort needed to achieve such a breakthrough is unknown but players have a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304680

Centralized Policymaking and Informational Lobbying

Li, Cheng - 2019

This paper compares centralized and decentralized policymaking in a game theoretic model of informational lobbying and political contributions. In the model, an interest group first produces verifiable evidence about the welfare effects of its preferred policy and then engages in monetary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900758