It is known that every continuous time fictitious play process approaches equilibrium in every nondegenerate 2x2 and 2x3 game, and it has been conjectured that convergence to equilibrium holds generally for 2xn games. We give a simple geometric proof of this.

In a recent article, Hahn [Hahn, S. (2008). The convergence of fictitious play in games with strategic complementarities. Economics Letters 99, 2, 304-306] claims to prove convergence of fictitious play in games with strategic complementarities. I show here that the proof is flawed and...

I show that under network competition with termination-based price discrimination access charges below marginal cost may be used as a collusion device, if the utility of receiving calls is accounted for. This holds even for linear prices and sharply contrasts recent results in the literature...

Cooperating in the Prisoner's Dilemma is irrational and some supporting mechanism is needed to stabilize cooperation. Indirect reciprocity based on reputation is one such mechanism. Assessing an individual's reputation requires first-order information, i.e. knowledge about its previous behavior,...

Fictitious play is a classical learning process for games, and games with strategic complementarities are an important class including many economic applications. Knowledge about convergence properties of fictitious play in this class of games is scarce, however. Beyond games with a unique...