of trust, integrity, in-group cooperation and altrusim, the tendency is to build up these from the axiom of individually … paper demonstrates how our selfish rationality interacts with out innate sense of cooperation. The model is used to outline … circumstances under which cooperation will occur and circumstances where it will break down. The paper also studies how sub …

personal costs of within-group versus collective cooperation, supporting the weighted average social preference theory by … conflicts. A first experiment shows that a between-group conflict leads to within-group cooperation and particularly individuals …

We explore the extent to which altruism, as measured by giving in a dictator game (DG), accounts for play in a noisy … version of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. We find that DG giving is correlated with cooperation in the repeated game when no … cooperative equilibria exist, but not when cooperation is an equilibrium. Furthermore, none of the commonly observed strategies …

There is continuing debate about what explains cooperation and self-sacrifice in nature and in particular in humans …

Mutation-generated variation in behavior is thought to promote the evolution of cooperation. Here, we study this by … populations. First, we show how cooperation can evolve through the direct effect of mutation, i.e., the fitness impact that …) for which cooperation can be favored by an indirect effect of mutation, i.e., the fitness impact that individuals …

factors that are known to affect cooperation levels, and in so doing replicate and extend previous empirical research on …

Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms driving the evolution of cooperation in human societies. There are … two types of indirect reciprocity: upstream and downstream reciprocity. Cooperation in downstream reciprocity follows the … pattern ‘You helped someone, and I will help you’, while the direction of cooperation is reversed in upstream reciprocity …

to play the prisoner's dilemma game enhances cooperation, (iii) if the payoff for simultaneous defection is negative …