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Yardstick competition, corruption, and electoral incentives

Long, Ngo Van (contributor); … - 2008

distortionary tax. We demonstrate the possibility that yardstick competition itself fails to restrict rent seeking. We complement … static case. -- Yardstick competition ; rent-seeking ; public good ; electoral incentives …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003730296

Insuring Rents

Cutsinger, Bryan - 2019

Economists have long recognized the need for durability-enhancing mechanisms to facilitate political exchange, but the focus has been almost entirely on mechanisms that raise the cost of reneging on bargains once they have been struck. What happens if these mechanisms fail? This paper argues...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012871987

Our Federalism Is Not Europe’s : It's Becoming Argentina’s

Greve, Michael - 2012

American “we-do-federalism-right” triumphalism. In the United States, as in Europe, subordinate governments are beset by … governments. That commitment was once the glory of American federalism. Over the past decade, however, the no-bailout commitment … has effectively collapsed. Its demise entails fundamental changes in American federalism, none of them encouraging. After …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014164095

The Challenge of Fiscal Adjustment in a Democracy : The Case of India

Hausmann, Ricardo - 2006

India`s fiscal problem has deep roots in its federal fiscal system, where multiple players find it difficult to coordinate adjustment. The size and closed nature of the Indian economy, aided by its deep domestic capital market and large captive pool of domestic savings, has disguised the cost of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012783125

An experimental investigation of colonel blotto games

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kovenock, Dan; Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2009

This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265974

Intertwined Federalism : Accountability Problems Under Partial Decentralization

Joanis, Marcelin - 2009

Decentralization reforms typically lead to the coexistence of multiple tiers of government in a given policy area. To analyze the welfare effects of such partial decentralization, this paper develops a political agency model in which two levels of government are involved in public good provision...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014201038

The new institutional economics of antitrust and regulation

Bickenbach, Frank - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013261070

The new institutional economics of antitrust and regulation

Bickenbach, Frank; Kumkar, Lars; Soltwedel, Rüdiger - 1999

Hybrid governance structures between markets and hierarchies in many industries, e.g., in energy and telecommunications, challenge antitrust and regulation policy. The paper focuses on the theoretical and methodological basis provided by the New Institutional Economics (NIE) for analyzing the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011490672

Endogenous Liquidity Constraints in a Dynamic Contest

Grossmann, Martin - 2011

of competition but rather influence tomorrow's contest. A higher contest prize in both periods surprisingly decreases …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118878

A nested contest : Tullock meets the all-pay auction

Amegashie, J. Atsu - 2012

I present a two-player nested contest which is a convex combination of two widely studied contests: the Tullock (lottery) contest and the all-pay auction. A Nash equilibrium exists for all parameters of the nested contest. If and only if the contest is sufficiently asymmetric, then there is an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009659345