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Equilibrium in the symmetric Hirshleifer contest : uniqueness and characterization

Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen - 2018

The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to admit a unique equilibrium. The support of the equilibrium strategy is finite and includes, in particular, the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011824432

Horizontal and Vertical Conflict : Experimental Evidence

Galiani, Sebastián - 2016

Two types of political conflicts of interest pervade many of the world's societies. A horizontal conflict of interest … arises when different constituencies support different policies, while a vertical conflict of interest emerges when those in … predictions using two experiments. In both cases we find support for the proposition that more intense horizontal conflict leads …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013002429

Incomplete Information in Rent-seeking Contests

Wasser, Cédric - 2014

We consider a variant of the Tullock lottery contest. Each player's constant marginal cost of effort is drawn from a potentially different continuous distribution. In order to study the impact of incomplete information we compare three informational settings to each other: players are either...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013070148

Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests

Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2011

We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests and show that asymmetric equilibria may arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We also identify contests in the literature where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128752

Generalized Contest Success Functions

Rai, Birendra K. - 2007

The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which speciamp;#64257;es the winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume that contestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes these axiomatizations to the case where...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012728641

Internal versus external rent-seeking with in-group inequality and public good provision

Bakshi, Dripto; Dasgupta, Indraneel - 2021

inequality between the rich and others within a community depresses between-group conflict. Within-group conflict may fall as … well. The "paradox of power" is violated for both kinds of conflict - better-endowed individuals are more successful in the … internal conflict, while better-endowed groups are more successful in the external conflict. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012703084

Tullock brings perseverance and suspense to tug-of-war

Karagözoğlu, Emin; Sağlam, Hüseyin Çağri; Turan, … - 2020

We model the dynamic contest between two players as a game of tug-of-war with a Tullock contest success function (CSF). We show that (pure strategy) Markov perfect equilibrium of this game exists, and it is unique. In this equilibrium - in stark contrast to a model of tug-of-war with an all pay...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012165990

Internal v. external rent-seeking with in-group inequality and public good provision

Bakshi, Dripto; Dasgupta, Indraneel - 2021

-group conflict. Within group conflict may fall as well. The 'paradox of power' is violated for both kinds of conflict - better … endowed individuals are more successful in the internal conflict, while better-endowed groups are more successful in the … external conflict. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012792712

The n-Player Hirshleifer Contest

Ewerhart, Christian - 2020

in cut-throat competition, while any others become ultimately inactive. Of some conceptual interest is the observation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824146

The Approach of Expansive Game : Externality in Resource Allocation Contest

Li, Xinmi; Zheng, Jie - 2022

In this paper, we show that pure strategy Nash Equilibria in Prime Game and Expansive Game can be linked through an invertible mapping, with which the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in Prime Game can be easily derived from Expansive Game. Our results provide a tool to solve pure strategy Nash...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013289274