We introduce three variations of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict … altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making …

impact is non monotonous and is conditional on a) equilibrium type: conflict (rent-seeking) or peace, b) the reasons of … changes in wealth distribution, and c) the size of the ruling class, “elite”. In the conflict stage, institutional quality … conflict to peace stage (with no rent-seeking and fast growth) requires the reduction of inequality. This generates an …

rent-seeking to conflict and sports. We first examine the theoretical foundations of contest functions and classify them …

We introduce three extensions of the Hirshleifer–Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict … altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making …

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to … punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical … prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is …

context of a finitely repeated intergroup contest and demonstrate that conflict expenditures are significantly higher if … intergroup conflict and group rent-seeking. …

and rent-seeking to conflict and sports. We first examine the theoretical foundations of contest functions and classify …