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Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information

Ewerhart, Christian; Quartieri, Federico - 2013

Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Games and Economic Behavior, 1997) have provided useful conditions for the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games of complete information. In this paper, we generalize their results to contests with incomplete informa tion. Two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010208517

Simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts

Münster, Johannes - In: Economic Theory 32 (2007) 2, pp. 333-352

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005155323

Rent-seeking in different political environments

Wickström, Bengt-Arne - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000885262

The case for abolishing federal taxation

Alm, Richard; Lee, Dwight R. - In: The journal of private enterprise 28 (2013) 2, pp. 125-137

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009760079

Political centralization and government accountability

Boffa, Federico; Piolatto, Amedeo; Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M. - In: The quarterly journal of economics 131 (2016) 1, pp. 381-422

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011517338

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi; Herrmann, Benedikt; … - 2009

We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to … punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that … conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277486

Where are the rent seekers?

Hillman, Arye L.; Ursprung, Heinrich W. - 2016

In a remarkably simple and yet in one of the most original and insightful observations of 20th century economics, Gordon Tullock observed that there are efficiency losses when public policies and political behavior create contestable rents. Tullock also observed that social losses from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011447512

Selecting less corruptible bureaucrats

Hu, Audrey Xianhua; Zou, Liang - 2007

A government officials' propensity to corruption, or corruptibility, can be affected by his intertemporal preference over job benefits. Through a dynamic model of rent-seeking behavior, this paper examines how endogenously determined corruptibility changes with monitoring intensity, salary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011373824

Evolving Federations and Regional Public Deficits : Testing the Bailout Hypothesis in the Spanish Case

Lago-Pentilde;as, Santiago - 2009

High debt autonomy and low tax autonomy often characterize evolving federations, making the bailout hypothesis very attractive in resolving subcentral government deficits. However, meeting both conditions is not enough to conclude that bailout expectations are the main reason for a potential...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012765550

How alliances form and conflict ensues

Dong, Lu; Huang, Lingbo; Lien, Jaimie W.; Zheng, Jie - 2021 - Current draft: July, 2021

-makers form, and what determines whether a conflict will arise? We study a network formation game between ex-ante symmetric … players in the laboratory to examine the dynamics of alliance formation and conflict evolution. A peaceful equilibrium yields …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012603859