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Leibbrandt, Andreas; Sääksvuori, Lauri - In: European economic review : EER 56 (2012) 6, pp. 1136-1147

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009696379

Cubel, Maria - 2014

Contests are situations in which a set of agents compete for a valuable object, rent or award. The present paper analyzes difference-form group contests, that is, contests fought among groups and where their probability of victory depends on the difference of their effective efforts. First, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013056899

Contests : a comparison of timing and information structures

Ludwig, Sandra - 2011

We study a model of imperfectly discriminating contests with two ex ante symmetric agents. We consider four institutional settings: Contestants move either sequentially or simultaneously and in addition their types are either public or private information. We find that an effort-maximizing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009124645

Information acquisition in conflicts

Morath, Florian; Münster, Johannes - 2010

This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use ou rresults...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950481

Mitigating the Shadow of Conflict - The Role of Social and Human Capital for the Reduction of Conflicts

Schmidt, Dorothee - 2007

One possible solution to mitigate the negative influences of conflict which has been proposed in the literature is to … increasing an individual's social capital will lead her to reduce her conflict effort, whereas increasing her human capital can … induce her to increase her conflict effort. We then analyze which conditions need to be present to induce the individuals to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012730205

Rent-seeking contests under symmetric and asymmetric information

Wasser, Cédric - 2010

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950459

Government size and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with rent-seeking

Wadho, Waqar; Ayaz, Umair - 2017

We explore the relationship between government size and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with human capital and an unproductive capital which facilitates rent-seeking. With exogenous as well as endogenous time discounting, we find a non-monotonic relationship between the size of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012120573

Self-Allocation in Contests

Bernergard, Axel - 2017

We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one where no contestant would wish to change his choice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947451

The Equivalence of Contests

Chowdhury, Subhasish M. - 2010

We use a Tullock-type contest model to show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically and revenue equivalent to each other. We consider a two-player contest, where outcome-contingent payoffs are linear functions of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013143626

The n-player Hirshleifer contest

Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen - 2023 - Revised version, October 2023

While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based on the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive noise …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014380413