One of the key components of corporate governance frameworks, the audit committee is a potent instrument for controlling and supervising earning management. It might significantly affect how decisions about internal firm-board monitoring are made. The purpose of this study was to investigate the...

We apply voting theory to the context of audit committees and examine how the even-odd nature of audit committees is related to earnings quality. We hypothesize that an audit committee with an odd number of directors can improve the committee's voting efficiency by better aggregating directors'...

Regulators have frequently expressed concerns about corporate earnings management. Audit committees are expected to monitor managers' financial reporting, including attempts to manipulate earnings numbers. The extant literature has focused on managers'incentives to manipulate earnings numbers....

This study analyses the association between the competence of audit committee members and earnings management in a sample of 142 non-financial firms from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom over the 2006–2013 period. We measure members' competence through their dedication and...

In this paper, we examine the impact of distracting events to audit committee members on the firms' earnings quality. Specifically, we focus on major events occurring simultaneously at other firms in which the audit committee members also serve as board members or CEOs. We find that during the...