In a sequencing problem with linear time cost, Suijs (1996) proved that it is possible to achieve first best. By first best we mean that one can find mechanisms that satisfy efficiency of decision, dominant strategy incentive compatibility and budget balancedness. In this paper we show that...

We identify a sufficient class of coalitional form games with transferable utility for which prenucleolus coincides with the Shapley value. We then apply our result to simple games and to generalized queueing games.

We examine the tradeoffs between two variants of group strategyproofness, efficiency and budget balance in queueing models. In general, group strategyproofness is incompatible with efficiency and budget balance. Weakening budget balance to feasibility, we show that the incompatibility persists...

We extend the literature on the coincidence of the prenucleolus and the Shapley value, by identifying a class of coalitional form games called PS games. We analyse the role of PS games in the context of queueing problems, and show that in the class of generalized queueing games only those...