This paper provides a microeconomic analysis of subsistence consumption in the consumer theory framework. Our key concepts are 'irrelevance' of a good in certain consumption bundles (increasing its amount does not make the consumer better off) and an 'unhappy set' (any bundle outside such a set...

We address the mechanism design issue for the sequencing problem. We identify the just sequencing rule that serves the agents in the non-increasing order of their waiting costs and prove that it is a Rawlsian rule. We identify all rVCG mechanisms that implement the just sequencing rule. The...

This paper characterizes lexicographic preferences over alternatives that are identified by a finite number of attributes. Our characterization is based on two key concepts: a weaker notion of continuity called 'mild continuity' (strict preference order between any two alternatives that are...

We provide a full characterisation of the set of trading equilibria (in which all goods are traded at a positive price) in a strategic market game (as introduced by Shapley and Shubik),for both the "buy and sell" and the "buy or sell" versions of this model under standard assumptions on the...

We address the issue of bidder ring formation in single and multi-unit Vickrey auctions. We address this issue in a bargaining game set up under the assumption that valuation of bidders is commonly known only amongst themselves. In the single unit case, we show that the equilibrium coalition...

In this paper, we revisit a long-standing question on the structure of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions (SCFs) in classical exchange economies (Hurwicz (1972)). Using techniques developed by Myerson in the context of auction-design, we show that in a specific...

This paper characterizes lexicographic preferences over alternatives that are identified by a finite number of attributes. We say two alternatives are 'totally different' if they are different with respect to every attribute. Our characterization is based on two key concepts: a weaker notion of...

We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator has limited funds. The optimal regulatory mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient types produce the same quantity irrespective of their...