In this paper we consider the problem of regulating an open access essential facility. A vertically integrated firm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market under the roof of a regulatory mechanism. There is a potential entrant in the downstream market. Both competitors use...

In this paper we analyze sequencing situations under incomplete information where agents have interdependent costs. We first argue why Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (or VCG) mechanism fails to implement a simple sequencing problem in dominant strategies. Given this impossibility, we try to implement...

In a two-good setting we axiomatize (a) preferences with subsistence consumption and (b) a generalized version of Leontief preferences. Our axiomatization allows for different levels of subsistence and captures the presence of poverty and prosperity. Our axioms are based on the irrelevance of...

In a two-good setting we axiomatize (a) preferences with subsistence consumption and (b) a generalized version of Leontief preferences. Our axiomatization allows for different levels of subsistence and captures the presence of poverty and prosperity. Our axioms are based on the irrelevance of...

We address the issue of bidder ring formation in single and multi-unit Vickrey auctions. We address this issue in a bargaining game set up under the assumption that valuation of bidders is commonly known only amongst themselves. In the single unit case, we show that the equilibrium coalition...

We analyse a (differentiated good) industry where an incumbent firm owns a network good (essential input) and faces potential competition in the (downstream) retail market. Unlike the traditional approach, we consider a scenario where the decision to compete or not in the downstream segment is...

We revisit the comparison between Bertrand and Cournot competition in a symmetric differentiated oligopoly where each firm maximizes a weighted average of its own profit and welfare. Under very general specifications, Bertrand competition yields higher prices and profits, and lower quantities,...

In this paper, we revisit a long-standing question on the structure of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions (SCFs) in classical exchange economies (Hurwicz (1972)). Using techniques developed by Myerson in the context of auction-design, we show that in a specific...

We study the dynamics of the “Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem”. The problem is the following: In each period, N agents have to choose between N restaurants. Agents have a common ranking of the restaurants. Restaurants can only serve one customer. When more than one customer arrives at the...